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Professor van der Merwe has introduced a case from the Court of 
Session in Scotland, Kinloch Damph Ltd. v. Nordvik Salmon 
Farms Ltd.,1 and has outlined the history of specification as it has 
been treated in Roman, Roman-Dutch, and Scottish authorities.2  
The purpose of this Postscript is to ask whether Kinloch Damph 
might have been decided differently, and whether a living thing, 
undergoing natural growth, might ever be the object of specifica-
tion. 
I. 
The facts may be repeated very briefly.3  The pursuers supplied 
salmon smolts to the defenders under two contracts.  Under the 
contracts title would not pass until the price was paid.  The de-
fenders fed and husbanded the smolts, and they grew to be 
salmon thirty times their original size.  The defenders defaulted 
in payment, and went into receivership.  The pursuers sued for 
the return of the salmon under the contract.  The defenders 
claimed that the retention-of-title clauses were ineffective, and 
that they (and latterly their receivers) were the owners of the 
salmon by specification.  The specification argument is the subject 
of the discussion below. 
Lord Macfadyen accepted that the rule of specification in 
Scotland was the media sententia expressed by Justinian in Insti-
tutes 2.1.25.4  Thus the result would turn on the reducibility of the 
                                                 
*  The author is grateful to Philip Orkin of the University of Aber-
deen (retired), for his advice on salmon. 
1  1999 Outer House Cases LEXIS (June 30, 1999). 
2 Above,  96–114. 
3 See  Kinloch Damph, paras. 1–5. 
4 Whether  the  media sententia relied on by Lord Macfadyen is 
Justinian's is not clear.  What Justinian calls his media sententia includes 
the rule that property is with the maker if the maker adds any of his own 
materials.  Institutes 2.1.25.  Whether this rule operated without regard to 
reducibility is an open question.  Compare B. Nicholas, An Introduction to 
Roman Law (Oxford, 1962), 137 (suggesting that it does operate even if 116  Roman Legal Tradition  Vol. 2 
 
 
final object.5  The reducibility rule, if applied uncritically, would 
suggest that the maker of the salmon should be the owner, be-
cause the smolts no longer exist and salmon cannot be reduced to 
smolts.  Lord Macfadyen saw correctly that the answer was not so 
straightforward.  He decided against the maker on the ground 
that, however irreducible salmon might be, the doctrine of specifi-
cation did not apply to this kind of property.  He says:6 
[I]n my opinion the proper scope of the doctrine is in relation 
to inanimate objects or substances created by human effort 
out of materials which are used up and cease to exist in the 
process of creation.  There is nothing in the authorities to 
suggest that the doctrine is applicable to the process of 
growth of living creatures.  . . .  The examples in the writings 
on the subject contain no references to specificatio of growing 
animals.  I consider that there is force in the submission [of 
the pursuers] that, having regard to the much greater impor-
tance of animals in daily life in former times (whether the 
times of the Roman writers or those of the Scottish institu-
tional writers), the absence of such reference is a strong indi-
cation that the doctrine had no such application. 
I suggest below that Lord Macfadyen was right to decide against 
the maker, but that he was not right to exclude natural growth 
from specification, rather that a better reason for rejecting specifi-
cation in this case lies elsewhere. 
                                                 
the thing is reducible) with Buckland, Text-Book of Roman Law, 216 (sug-
gesting that if reducibility were ignored the rule would be unreasonable).  
But since Lord Macfadyen does not include this rule, it is perhaps properly 
the media sententia of the Scottish institutional writers which forms the 
basis of the opinion.  The point would be a purely academic one, except for 
the uncertainty introduced by this "maker's own materials" rule which, if 
accepted by Scots law, could weight matters much more in favor of the 
maker. 
5  Lord Macfadyen decided to address the question of specification 
without regard to the parties' contract: "I do not find it necessary to decide 
. . . whether the pursuers are right . . . that specificatio only operates in 
default of the question of ownership of the new thing having been ad-
dressed by the parties."  Kinloch Damph, para. 47.  Because specification 
questions do tend to arise where agreements have gone awry (see the 
discussion below), Roman law does give some importance to the presence 
of an agreement, and in particular to the person in whose interest some-
thing is made.  See, e.g., D.41.1.25 (Call. 2 inst.).  Obviously, many manu-
facturing contracts would be worthless if specification always trumped the 
contract.  Lord Macfadyen's comments on specification may therefore be 
obiter to the decision.  
6  Kinloch Damph, para. 47 (emphasis added). 2004    Postscript on nova species  117 
 
 
II. 
The first question is whether Lord Macfadyen correctly inter-
preted the want of examples on natural growth.  The principal list 
of examples from the classical law is in Gaius 2.79, and it may 
indeed be a "closed list," in the sense that the Romans would not 
have treated events outside the established types as specifica-
tion.7  But the more important point is that the limited Roman ex-
amples were probably not dictated and determined by doctrine, 
but were derived from disputes which arose in certain commercial 
matters, and on the basis of which a doctrine developed after-
wards.  Mayer-Maly says:8 
These types [listed in Gaius 2.79] . . . cover the most impor-
tant matters for agricultural and industrial labor, as a com-
parison with the related cases in D.19.2, on locatio conductio, 
show.  Accordingly, we are not dealing with examples of 
School learning, but with certain leading cases from which 
the legal institution of specification developed. 
Thomas adds:9 
[T]he instances discussed are virtually all cases like the 
making of clothes, vases, rings, etc., out of given materials — 
cases that is where, in the appropriate circumstances, there 
would be a locatio operis faciendi.  In short, the cases dis-
cussed in connection with specificatio in juristic literature are 
fairly concrete cases that could really arise and not situations 
of the sort to delight purely academic discussion as abstract 
problems. 
                                                 
7  J. A. C. Thomas, Textbook of Roman Law (Amsterdam, 1976), 175. 
8  T. Mayer-Maly, "Spezifikation: Leitfälle, Begriffsbildung, Rechts-
institut," 73 ZSS (rom. Abt.) 120, 133 (1956): "Diese Typen decken . . . die 
wichstigsten Sparten landwirtschaftlicher und gewerblicher Arbeit, wie 
ein Vergleich mit den in D 19, 2 zur locatio conductio herangezogen Fälle 
zeigt.  Daher handelt es sich nicht um Beispiele einer Schulgelehrsamkeit, 
sondern um jene Leitfälle, aus denen das Rechtsinstitut der Spezifikation 
erwachsen ist."  Similarly: T. Mayer-Maly, Locatio Conductio: Eine Unter-
suchung zum klassischen römischen Recht (Vienna, 1956), 76. 
9  J. A. C. Thomas, "Non solet locatio dominium mutare," in Mé-
langes Philippe Meylan (Lausanne, 1963), 1:351.  Thomas goes on to argue 
that the School views on specification are such as to accommodate their 
respective views on locatio conductio operis.  Id. at 354–55.  Cf. A. Watson, 
Roman and Comparative Law (Athens, 1991), 47–48: "All these methods of 
acquisition, but especially [specification and accession], created difficult 
questions of title, but it is clear from the texts that the problems seldom 
came before the courts.  The discussions illustrate the Roman delight in 
raising legal questions and establishing principle and detail."  118  Roman Legal Tradition  Vol. 2 
 
 
Thus the types of specification we find in the juristic literature 
perhaps typically would have arisen where a conductor accepted a 
piece of work, but then performed the work suo nomine,10 raising 
a question of ownership that would not have arisen if he had 
performed the work according to the parties' agreement.11  O f  
course if the Romans had known of a process to transform one 
kind of living thing into another, that process might have become 
the subject of locatio conductio and specification, and provided the 
kind of juristic examples which Lord Macfadyen missed.  But 
these disputes simply did not arise, or more accurately, when dis-
putes did arise about the ownership of living and growing things, 
rules on the acquisition of fruits usually gave a satisfactory an-
swer.  The state of industry did not force the Romans to look for 
more exotic solutions, and they did not do so.  
  The Roman doctrine on specification is therefore founded on 
certain limited industrial and agricultural processes.  The doc-
trine might have been different if the jurists had had other proc-
esses to hand, but the absence of examples on natural growth is 
no basis for the conclusion that the jurists categorically excluded 
natural growth from specification. 
  On the other hand, it is unlikely that Roman doctrine would 
have recognized a specification in the natural growth that took 
place in this case.  Treating natural growth as the object of a 
manufacturing process introduces a novelty (and a paradox) into 
specification: in the regular course of natural growth, the final 
                                                 
10  D.41.1.7.7 (Gaius 2 rerum cott.).  In this context, it means "in his 
own interest."  See Mayer-Maly (note 8), 130.  Similarly: D.24.1.31.1 
(Pomp. 14 Sab.); D.41.1.25 (Call. 2 inst.); D.41.1.27.1 (Pomp. 30 Sab.).  The 
phrase is discussed extensively in B. C. Stoop, "Non solet locatio dominium 
mutare: Some Remarks on specificatio in Classical Roman Law," 66 T. v. 
R. 3, 8–17 (1998). 
11  Daube points out that this aspect of specification was obvious and 
rarely needed pointing out: 
According to the Proculians, if I make a new thing — a chair, a vessel 
— with your raw material — your wood, your gold — I become owner.  
The non-application of this principle if I am a worker in your factory 
is so self-evident that Gaius [2.79] does not trouble about it.  A 
slightly later work based on his [sc. Institutes],  Res Cottidianae 
[D.41.1.7.7], does say that, to become owner, I must have made the 
thing meo nomine, on my behalf.  The BGB, the German civil code [§ 
950 BGB], follows in Gaius's footsteps.  In the second commission a 
proposal to insert this requirement was rejected.  It was declared 
selbstverständlich, manifest, that he who has the thing made is the 
true maker: herstellen lassen equals herstellen. 
D. Daube, "The Self-Understood in Legal History," 18 Jur. Rev. (n.s.) 126 
[= Collected Studies, 2:1277], 128 (1973) (notes omitted). 2004    Postscript on nova species  119 
 
 
product is always irreducible, but the original thing is not des-
troyed.  Yet specification assumes the destruction of the original 
thing.12  Even the Sabinians, in giving ownership to the owner of 
the materials, did not assume that the original thing survived the 
actions of the maker: a different ownership arose in the new 
thing.13  Therefore what is significant in the case of smolts and 
salmon is not, strictly speaking, that the salmon are irreducible to 
smolts, but that the smolts were never destroyed and reconsti-
tuted in such a way that would have produced either the "discon-
tinuous"14 ownership of the Sabinians, or the "new" ownership of 
the Proculians.  Neither school would have recognized specifica-
tion here.  The test of reducibility unfortunately obscures the fact 
that it is the destruction of the original thing which creates the 
problem in the first place.  
  Another way of putting it is that if an owner of (former) 
smolts had gone before the Roman Praetor and attempted to vin-
dicate the salmon which grew from his smolts, the Praetor would 
have readily given him a trial without seeking the advice of either 
School.  As Wieacker says, so long as something can be put before 
the Praetor in which he recognizes the former property of the 
plaintiff, the claim of ownership will be allowed to go forward for 
trial.15  What confuses the issue is Justinian's media sententia: in 
ordinary manufacturing processes, irreducibility is a guarantee 
that the original thing cannot be vindicated; in the case of natural 
growth it is not a guarantee. 
III. 
In what sorts of cases, if any, should a court recognize a new 
thing, and a new ownership, in the product of natural growth?  If 
one relies on the examples of industrial processes and follows the 
reducibility test strictly, the maker will always be the owner.   
                                                 
12  A point made by the pursuers: Kinloch Damph, para. 44. 
13  Thomas (note 9), 351–52.  "On this basis the Schools would thus 
agree that a new thing existed in place of the materials; it is the disposal 
of the new thing which is in dispute."  Id. at 352.  Cf. H. Hausmaninger 
and W. Selb, Römisches Privatrecht, 8th ed. (Vienna, 1997), 228: "Die 
Sache [den Sabinianern nach] bleibt trotz Verarbeitung im Grunde 
dieselbe, sie kann deshalb vom Stoffeigentümer vindiziert werden." 
14  Thomas's word: Thomas (note 9), 352. 
15  F. Wieacker, "Spezifikation: Schulprobleme und Sachprobleme," in 
W. Kunkel and H. J. Wolff (edd.), Festschrift für Ernst Rabel (Tübingen, 
1954), 2:288 ("Sofern dem Prätor nur etwas vorgewiesen werden konnte, 
in dem er die frühere Sache des Klägers wahrnahm, oder — bei Grund-
stücken und Sachinbegriffen — sobald eine pars pro toto vor Gericht ge-
bracht war, traf das hanc rem suam meam esse aio der alten Spruchformel 
zu . . . ."). 120  Roman Legal Tradition  Vol. 2 
 
 
This is obviously not satisfactory.  However, the industrial acces-
sion theory, which appears to be followed in Scotland,16 gives 
some guidance.  Industrial accession says that the labor expended 
in creating a new thing is so great that the original materials lose 
their identity in that labor.  It is not clear how much labor is 
needed to make a difference; in this respect the theory is not help-
ful.  But the theory rightly recognizes that identity-loss is the 
event that needs explaining.  As just discussed, when the identity 
of a thing is lost by some process, vindication is an inadequate 
remedy, whence the need for the institution of specification.  The 
industrial accession theory focuses on this identity-loss: where a 
process leads to identity-loss, there is accession to the maker's 
labor, and specification. 
  Salmon are readily identifiable as the product of smolts be-
cause their development follows a familiar model.  This will be the 
case in virtually all instances of natural growth, no matter how 
much effort a person may put into tending the thing, no matter 
how much of his own materials he introduces,17 and no matter 
how new the final product seems to be.  But if a person somehow 
averts the natural pattern of growth of a thing, so that its devel-
opment no longer follows a familiar model, it may lose its identity. 
  A possible case of "averted natural growth" was the subject of 
an opinion by the California Supreme Court, and was analyzed by 
David Johnston in light of specification.18  The case concerned 
cells that were taken from Moore, a medical patient.  Moore pos-
sessed white blood cells which overproduced a certain protein 
with therapeutic value; the overproduction made it more easy to 
identify the gene which produced the protein.19  The court ex-
plained:20 
Cells taken directly from the body (primary cells) are not very 
useful for these purposes.  Primary cells typically reproduce a 
few times and then die.  One can, however, sometimes cont-
inue to use cells for an extended period of time by developing 
them into a "cell line," a culture capable of reproducing in-
definitely. 
The University of California used Moore's cells to develop such a 
cell line, and obtained a patent.  Moore then sued for conversion, 
                                                 
16 Above,  110. 
17 See,  however, note 4 above. 
18  See Moore v. Regents of the University of California, 51 Cal. 3d 
120, 793 P.2d 479 (1990); D. Johnston, "The Renewal of the Old," 56 Cam-
bridge L.J. 80 (1997). 
19  51 Cal. 3d at 127 n.2. 
20  Id. (emphasis added). 2004    Postscript on nova species  121 
 
 
among other claims.21  The court rejected the claim for conver-
sion.22  The court did not analyze the dispute in light of specifica-
tion; Johnston suggests it would have done well to do so, because 
the policy arguments on which it did rely were not compelling, 
and in any event were unconnected to the underlying question of 
property rights.23 
  This is the kind of case in which we can speak of a nova spe-
cies created from a growing, living thing.  The identity of Moore's 
cells has been lost: we could identify them as Moore's only by their 
natural pattern of growth (which is "to reproduce a few times and 
then die"24), but their natural pattern of growth has been averted 
by the labor of the University of California.  
  The theory of industrial accession does not give a bright-line 
rule, but this, in any event, is the kind of analysis that the history 
of specification suggests is the right one. 
                                                 
21  Id. at 125–28. 
22  Id. at 134–47. 
23  Johnston (note 18), 92–93.  Johnston's argument is that it is better 
to postpone policy arguments until one has revealed the structure of rights 
which underlies the dispute.  Id.  He assumes for the sake of argument 
that there has been a specification of Moore's cells, and considers whether 
the law ought to compensate Moore on that assumption.  Id.  A recent 
article which discusses Moore has not taken Johnston's advice, but re-
treated into arguments of pure policy.  Under the proposed policies the 
matter would turn on the patient's (or his representative's) consent.  The 
policies are commendable, but the key question of ownership remains: 
what proprietary right passes by consent?  See L. Skene, "Proprietary 
Rights in Human Bodies, Body Parts and Tissue: Regulatory Contexts and 
Proposals for New Laws," 22 Legal Studies 102, 120 (2002).  
24  Above, text accompanying note 20. 